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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-What Constitutes a RaceNeutral Explanation for Using Peremptory Challenges?
State v. Guzman and Purkett v. Elem
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision, State v. Guzman,'
reversed and remanded two convictions based on the prosecution's inappropriate use of peremptory challenges. The court of appeals reviewed
the trial court's application of the test first set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 2 which held that racially motivated
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Batson provides a three-step inquiry to determine
whether racial classification formed the basis for a strike: (1) the opponent
makes a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was exercised
in a discriminatory manner; (2) the proponent rebuts the prima facie
showing by providing a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3)
the trial court then determines if the peremptory challenge was racially
motivated.' After finding that the trial court erred in applying the third
step of the inquiry, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed the
record to determine the sufficiency of the prima facie showing and
subsequent rebuttal .4
After the court of appeals decided Guzman, however, the United States
Supreme Court decided Purkett v. Elem,l a per curiam opinion that
clarifies the test set forth in Batson. The Purkett decision addresses the
second step of the inquiry, holding that the proponent of the strike can
satisfy the second step simply by offering an explanation which is raceneutral on its face.6 In contrast, New Mexico courts have applied the
Batson inquiry by requiring a plausible explanation 7 at the second step,
before proceeding to the third step of the analysis.
This Note addresses what impact Purkett has on Batson inquiries in
New Mexico. First, this Note summarizes how federal courts have historically addressed racial discrimination in jury selection. Second, this
1. 119 N.M. 190, 889 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 119 N.M. 20, 888 P.2d 466
(1995).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. Id. at 95-98.
4. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d at 229.
5. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (per curiam)(1995).
6. Id. at 1771.
7. State v. Moore, Ill N.M. 619, 620, 808 P.2d 69, 70 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, Ill N.M.
706, 809 P.2d 56 (1991) (the explanation must be "sufficient to provide an explanation that the
trial court can determine is a bona fide reason relating to legitimate criteria in selecting a jury on
behalf of the state"); State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 126, 782 P.2d 91, 98 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782 (1989) (reasons that are implausible or suggestive of bias require further
inquiry). See also State v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 197, 202, 784 P.2d 16, 21 (1989) (when conducting
an inquiry, the trial court should demand articulate and explicit substantiation of the explanation
for the challenges).
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Note explores how New Mexico has traditionally prohibited racially motivated peremptory challenges. Finally, this Note analyzes the Guzman
rationale and what effect Purkett may have on the exercise of peremptory
challenges in New Mexico courts.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants Margaret Guzman and Linda Gutierrez were convicted in
the Bernalillo County District Court of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute, conspiracy to commit distribution of marijuana, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. 8 During voir dire, the prosecution used
all five of its peremptory challenges 9 to strike Hispanics from the venire. 10
Invoking a Batson inquiry, counsel for Gutierrez objected that the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenges was racially motivated." Before
the trial court determined whether defense counsel had made a prima
facie showing to satisfy the first step of the inquiry, the prosecutor
initiated the second step by immediately explaining that he had challenged
two jurors because they were "young" and two others because they had
"less responsible jobs involving less education."'' 2 The trial court found
no "con[clerted plan to restrict the make up of the jury ... particularly
in view of the preponderance of accepted Hispanic surnamed jurors"
remaining on the petit jury.'3 The trial court further stated that Batson
was primarily concerned with fairness in terms of a jury composed of
a cross-section of the community.' 4 Thus, according to the trial court,
because a majority of Hispanics remained on the jury, the prosecutor's
challenges were permissible. 5
On appeal, the court of appeals remanded for a new trial, after finding
that the trial court improperly ruled on the Batson inquiry. 16 The court
of appeals found that the trial court's ruling was inconsistent with the

8. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 191, 889 P.2d at 226.
9. In non-capital cases in New Mexico, defense counsel may exercise five peremptory challenges,
while the prosecution may exercise three peremptory challenges. N.M. R. CRs. P. 5-606(D)(l)(b).
If two or more persons are tried jointly, both the prosecution and defense are allowed two additional
peremptory challenges per defendant. N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-606(D)(2). In capital cases, the defense
may exercise twelve peremptory challenges, while the prosecution may exercise eight. N.M. R. CRIM.
P. 5-606(D)(l)(a). In Guzman, the defendants were allowed a total of seven peremptory challenges;
the prosecution, five. 119 N.M. at 192, 889 P.2d at 227.
10. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 191, 889 P.2d at 226.
11. Id. "The State has exerted five strikes. So far, each and every one has been a Hispanic
venireman." Id. The prosecution also noted that defendants had used six of their seven peremptory
challenges to dismiss Anglo-surnamed prospective jurors. Id. at 191-92, 889 P.2d at 226-27. The
court held that Anglos are a cognizable racial group in New Mexico, and therefore prohibited strikes
predicated solely on a prospective juror's Anglo ethnicity. Id. at 194, 888 P.2d at 229.
12. Id. at 194, 889 P.2d at 229. If a prosecutor offers an explanation before the defendant
completely establishes a prima facie showing, she risks waiving the issue of whether defendant
actually met the prima facie burden if the trial court progresses to the ultimate question of
discrimination. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).
13. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 193, 889 P.2d at 228 (quoting district court's ruling) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added by court of appeals).
14. Id. at 193-94, 889 P.2d at 228-29.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 195, 889 P.2d at 230.
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test set forth in Batson and later adopted by New Mexico in State v.
Sandoval.'7 The trial court inappropriately conducted the third step of
the inquiry by examining the prima facie showing and rebuttal in light
of the defendant's right to a fair, impartial jury, guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.18 Batson, on the other hand, emphasized the rights of citizens
to participate in jury service and found that such racially motivated
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. 19
After reevaluating the inquiry by substituting an equal protection analysis, the court of appeals found that the peremptory challenges were
2
racially motivated. 20 Guzman and Gutierrez were granted a new trial. 1
III.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

To further the goal of selecting an impartial jury, courts allow litigants
to exercise two types of challenges during jury selection: challenges for
cause and peremptory challenges. 22 The use of such challenges allows
litigants to excuse jurors who do or might have particular biases which
prevent them from hearing a case objectively. 23 Challenges for cause, the
first type of challenge, are unlimited in number, provided the trial court
finds that a party has shown good cause for striking the juror. 24 In
addition, the trial judge herself may excuse a clearly biased juror for
cause. 25 The second type of challenge is a peremptory challenge, which
historically requires no finding of cause at all. 26 Unlike challenges for
cause, a set number of peremptory challenges27are granted by statute to
each party in both state and federal systems.
Arbitrary and capricious by nature, the peremptory challenge is often
based on a "hunch" or "seat-of-the-pants" instinct that a juror might

17. 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1987).
18. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d at 229.
19. 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.4 (1986). "[lIt is the stigma attached to the disqualification of a juror
because he or she appears to be of a particular racial or ethnic group that the Supreme Court has
has [sic] attempted to prevent .... " Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d at 229. Note, however,
that New Mexico courts have applied the impartial jury provision of the state constitution to limit
peremptory challenges. See discussion infra part III.B.
20. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d 229.
21. Id. at 195, 889 P.2d at 230.
22. HARRY I. SUnIN ET AL., THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS §
18.2(a), at 293 (1993) [hereinafter SUBIN].
23. Id.
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on
both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case
will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
24. SUBIN, supra note 22, § 17.5(b), at 283.
25. SurBi, supra note 22, § 18.2(a), at 293.
26. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one
exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
Id.
27. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1991); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1870 (1959) (in federal
courts, both parties are granted three peremptory challenges in civil cases); FED. R. CRIM. PROC.
24(b) (in federal criminal cases, each side is granted twenty peremptory challenges in capital cases;
in felony cases, the prosecution is allowed six peremptory challenges, while the defendant is allowed
ten).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol.

26

be biased.28 Peremptory challenges allow counsel, without having to show
cause, to strike a juror who may have an unconscious bias or may be
predisposed to favoring the other side. 29 The availability of the peremptory

challenge also allows counsel to delve more deeply into possible bias
during voir dire with less risk, since he may use the peremptory challenge
to dismiss a juror he inadvertently offended with sensitive questions.3 0
Even though peremptory challenges, by nature, are often based on inarticuable, gut feelings, courts have found that peremptory challenges
based solely on race or gender conflict with the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
A.

Federal Cases
1. Equal Protection Cases Involving Jury Discrimination, PreBatson
The use of peremptory challenges to perpetuate race and gender discrimination has been successfully challenged in federal courts on equal
protection grounds.3 2 Successful challenges to states' use of discriminatory
practices in jury selection began in 1879 with Strauder v. West Virginia.33
In Strauder, the United States Supreme Court struck down a statute
which excluded otherwise qualified African Americans from jury service
solely because of their race.3 4 The West Virginia statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause by denying African Americans the essential right of
jury participation. 5 The Court explained that the question was not whether
an African American "has a right to a grand or petit jury composed
in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color," but whether
"all persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because
of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any [African American]
3' 6
man sit upon the jury.

Subsequent years brought further challenges to jury selection predicated
on racial exclusion. For example, in Norris v. Alabama,3 7 the Court held
unconstitutional the administration of a venire qualification statute which,

28. Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
30. Id. at 219-220.
31. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of
race violate the Equal Protection Clause); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421
(1994) (the Equal Protection clause proscribes that "gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy
for juror competence and impartiality" when exercising peremptory challenges).
At least one petitioner has asked the Court to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges
based on religion, but the Court denied certiorari. See Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994)
(dissent to denial of petition for certiorari).
32. The Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl.4.
33. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). Strauder, an African American who was convicted of murder, successfully
attacked the constitutionality of the following statute: "All white male persons who are twenty-one
years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors.
...Id. at 305.
34. Id. at 310.
35. Id. at 308.
36. Id. at 305.
37. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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in effect, excluded African Americans from grand and petit venires.3 8
Although the statute at issue was facially neutral, years of its administration showed no African Americans "had served on any grand or
petit jury in [Jackson County, Alabama] within the memory of witnesses
who had lived there all their lives." 3 9 The "wholesale exclusion" of
otherwise qualified African Americans was enough to meet a prima facie
showing that the administration of the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.40 The Norris decision
resulted in the application of the "rule of exclusion," wherein a petitioner
had the burden of showing systematic exclusion of a segment of the
4
population over a period of time. '

Strauder, Norris, and other jury selection cases 42 provided the backdrop
for the first direct attack on racially motivated peremptory challenges,
Swain v. Alabama.4 1 While determining whether the exercise of peremptory
challenges could be subject to limitation, the Swain court carefully traced
the history and purpose of the peremptory challenge. 44 The Court underscored the fact that use of peremptory challenges is traditionally beyond
the subject of a court's control. 45 The Court held, however, that evidence
showing that African Americans had been excluded from juries in case
after case, for purposes wholly unrelated to the trial at hand, established
a prima facie showing of discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 6 Swain required the defendant to "show the prosecutor's
systematic use of peremptory challenges against [African Americans] over
a period of time. ' 47 In deference to peremptory challenges, the Court
declined to extend the rule of exclusion, or result analysis, set forth in
previous jury selection cases, and instead required evidence of the prosecutor's motivation for using peremptory challenges in case after case.4 1
2. Batson Replaces Swain
Not until over twenty years later did the Supreme Court reevaluate
Swain in Batson v. Kentucky. 49 The Court held that Swain's requirement
38. Id. at 590, 596.
39. Id. at 591.
40. Id. at 597.
41. Id. at 579.
42. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204 n.l (1965), in which the Court cited a plethora
of cases prohibiting racial discrimination in selection of the jury.
43. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Swain, an African American convicted of rape in Talladega County,
Alabama, challenged the jury system of the county, but failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id.
44. Id. at 212-22.
45. Id. at 220.
46. Id. at 224.
47. Id. at 227. Swain's case was at least as strong as Norris', based on the statistical evidence
of exclusion presented: 26% of the eligible males in the county were African American yet the
percentage of African Americans on jury panels was only 10-1501o. Id. at 205. Even so, the Court
distinguished previous jury selection cases from Swain, finding that the rule of exclusion should
not be "woodenly applied" to cases involving peremptory challenges. Id. at 227. The Court reached
this conclusion based upon the fact that defendants participate in the use of peremptory challenges,
while other jury selection practices are accomplished entirely by state actors. Id.
48. Id. at 223.
49. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Batson, an African American was indicted for second-degree burglary

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

of a "systematic showing" failed to provide prospective jurors with the
equal protection of the law.5 0 The Supreme Court replaced the Swain
burden of proof by allowing a defendant to establish a prima facie
showing of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges based on the
facts of the instant case." Those facts are sufficient to overcome the
presumption of proper use, that is, that the peremptory challenges were
2
used in a legitimate fashion, and were not racially motivated.1
Under Batson, whenever a party questions the propriety of peremptory
challenges, the trial court conducts a three-step inquiry to determine if
the challenges were racially motivated. At the first step, the opponent
of the strike must make a prima facie showing that (1) the juror belongs
to a cognizable racial group, 3 (2) the peremptory challenge constitutes
a jury selection practice which permits discrimination, and (3) "any other
relevant circumstances" which raise an inference of jury exclusion based

on race.5 4 Once the opponent of the strike establishes a prima facie

showing, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike, and the inquiry
proceeds to the second step of the analysis." At the second step, the
proponent must advance a race-neutral explanation for the strike related

and receipt of stolen goods. Id. at 82. At trial, the prosecutor struck all African American panel
members, which resulted in an all-white jury. Id. at 83.
50. Id. at 92-93 ("Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof .
). Although
Batson argued that the peremptory challenges violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn
from a fair-cross section, the Batson Court employed an equal protection analysis. Id. at 84 n.4.
Despite frequent invitations to extend the fair cross-section requirement to the petit jury, the Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that the Sixth Amendment's cross-section protection against partiality
applies only to the jury pool. See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.
52. Id. See id. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 96 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)). In the Batson decision,
the party challenging the strike had to be the same race as the prospective juror, but a subsequent
decision, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991), abolished that requirement. The Court also
has allowed Batson inquiries by a prosecutor who objected to defendant's use of racially motivated
peremptories, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 43 (1992) and by civil litigants, Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
54. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. What constitutes "any other relevant circumstances" has been
developed by lower courts. See, e.g., Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1992) (in which
prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire raised inference when prosecutor asked
prospective juror if sharing race with defendant would influence her objectivity); United States v.
Lewis, 892 F.2d 735, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that disparate treatment of whites and African
Americans who share the same occupation, residency, lifestyle, relationships, acquaintances, etc.,
might raise an inference contributing to prima facie showing); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d
741, 748 (3d Cir.) (listing five factors giving rise to necessary inference: number of prospective
jurors who belong to the cognizable group; the nature of the crime; the race of the defendant and
victim; pattern of strikes; and prosecutor's behavior during voir dire), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835
(1988); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1520 (6th Cir. 1988) (listing relevant
factors as to whether an inference exists: the racial composition of the initial group seated and the
final panel sworn; the number of peremptory challenge strikes allowed each side; the race of the
prospective jurors struck for both cause and peremptorily; the order of the strikes; and who exercised
the strikes); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that "the
additional fact that the Government used its peremptory challenges to strike the last remaining juror
of defendant's race is sufficient to raise an inference .... ").
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. When a proponent offers an explanation for the peremptory challenge,
and the trial court rules on the ultimate question, the issue'of whether an opponent has made a
prima facie showing is moot. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).
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to the particular case to be tried.16 Although the explanation need not
rise to the level of cause, a mere denial of discriminatory motive is
insufficient.17 Finally, the third step of the Batson inquiry requires the
trial court to consider both the prima facie case and rebuttal to determine
if, indeed, the opponent of the strike has established purposeful discrimination."
The Batson Court suggested that certain factors may give rise to a
necessary inference of purposeful discrimination, such as a pattern of
strikes against African American jurors5 9 and the content of the prosecutor's questions during voir dire.6 Batson's only instruction regarding
the sufficiency of an explanation for the strike was that the prosecutor's
explanation need not rise to the level of cause, but cannot be a mere
denial of racial motivation. 6' Based on the totality of the circumstances,
the trial court has to determine whether the defendant met his burden
of establishing purposeful discrimination. 62 The Court declined to formulate further instructions, acknowledging the different jury selection
procedures for state and federal courts. 63 Further, the trial court's assessment during step three is a factual inquiry that rests heavily on a
finding of credibility. 64 Thus, "a reviewing court ordinarily should give
'6
those findings great deference."
3. Purkett Clarifies Second Step
When deciding Batson, the Supreme Court left to lower courts the
task of developing detailed procedures for conducting the Batson inquiry.
Not until its 1995 term did the Court clarify what constitutes a sufficient
67
explanation to rebut the prima facie inference."6 In Purkett v. Elem,
the Court explained that the second step of the Batson inquiry requires
proponents simply to assert reasons for the strikes that are neutral on
their face. 6 The only guidance from Batson was that the strike did not

56. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id. at 97. Establishing a pattern is not necessary, however, since the U.S. Constitution
prevents a state from using peremptory challenges to strike any African American juror on the
basis of race. Id. at 99 n.22.
60. Id.at 97.
61. Id.at 97-98.
62. See id.at 98.
63. Id.at 99 n.24. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that roughly 7,000 jurisdictions and
500 federal trial judges were left to "find their way through the morass" without proper instruction
from the Court. Id. at 131 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.22 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)
(a Title VII sex discrimination case)).
65. Id.
66. But see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991): "At [the second] step of the inquiry,
the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Id. at
360.
67. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (per curiam) (1995).
68. Id. at 1771.
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have to rise to the level of cause, but a mere denial was insufficient. 69
After being convicted for second degree robbery, Purkett challenged,
through a writ of habeas corpus, the prosecution's use of peremptory
challenges to strike two African American jurors from the panel.70 The
prosecutor explained that one juror did not appear to be a good juror
because he had long, unkempt hair. 71 The Eighth Circuit remanded the
case because the prosecutor's explanation proffered at step two was not
plausible. 72 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, reasoning
that: "to say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or
superstitious reason at step [three] is quite different from saying that a
trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step [two] when the race-neutral
reason is silly or superstitious. 7 3 The Court explained that Batson required
the reason at step two to be reasonably "related to the particular case
to be tried" only to reinforce its warning that a mere denial of racial
motivation would be insufficient. 74 In so doing, the Court eschewed the
holding
Eighth Circuit's requirement that the explanation be plausible,
75
that the reason must be only race neutral on its face.
New Mexico Cases
While the United States Supreme Court used an equal protection analysis
to circumscribe racially motivated peremptory challenges, New Mexico
courts have employed the impartial jury provisions of the state constitution. New Mexico jurisprudence addressing racially motivated peremptory challenges has centered on applying the New Mexico Constitution
when the United States Supreme Court has failed to act. In addition,
New Mexico courts have crafted clear instructions for conducting each
step of the Batson inquiry.
New Mexico first applied the state constitution to prevent racially
motivated peremptory challenges in State v. Crespin,76 in response to the
insurmountable burden of Swain v. Alabama.77 In Crespin, an African
American defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court
had wrongly excluded from the record the State's reason for striking an
African American venireman. 78 Although affirming the trial court's ruling,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals indicated that improper use of peremptory challenges could be shown either by the procedure set forth in
79
Swain or under Article II, section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.
B.

69. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986).
70. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.at 1771.
74. Id. (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986)).
75. Id. "What [Batson] means by a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but
a reason that does not deny equal protection." Id.
76. 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (1980).
77. Id.at 486-88, 612 P.2d at 716-18 (analyzing Swain, 380 U.S. 202 (1965)).
78. Id. at 486, 612 P.2d at 716.
79. Id. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718. Article II, § 14 of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
"IT]he accused shall have' the right to ... an impartial jury . ..."
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563.

Under the New Mexico Constitution, a defendant could show that the
absolute number of challenges in one case raised the necessary inference
of purposeful discrimination. 0
New Mexico again applied the impartial trial guarantees of the state
constitution in State v. Aragon.8 In Aragon, a Hispanic defendant challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to strike two African
Americans from the venire. 82 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that
the right to an impartial jury extends to the use of peremptory challenges.83
Even though defendants are not entitled to a jury of a particular composition, "the state should not be able to accomplish indirectly at the
selection of the petit jury what it has not been able to accomplish directly
at the selection of the venire." 4 Both Crespin and Aragon applied
impartial jury principles, rather than the equal protection rationale used
by the United States Supreme Court. 5
In addition to decisions that applied the New Mexico Constitution to
prohibit racially motivated peremptory challenges, New Mexico has developed detailed procedures to conduct the Batson inquiry.8 6 From the
time New Mexico first adopted Batson in State v. Sandoval,87 it has
expounded upon what constitutes a prima facie case, the rebuttal, and
those factors to be considered in determining pretext. In New Mexico,
a "prima facie showing means such evidence as is sufficient in law to
raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless
rebutted. ' 88 After the juror's race is clearly established 8 9 New Mexico
courts consider three factors which give rise to the inference of improper
use to satisfy step one of the inquiry: (1) substantial underrepresentation
of defendant's racial group on the jury in comparison to the group's
population; 90 (2) susceptibility of the case to racial discrimination; 91 and

80. Crespin, 94 N.M. at 488, 612 P.2d at 718. A subsequent New Mexico decision averred this
same dicta, although the defendant actually failed to meet the lessened requirement. State v. Davis,
99 N.M. 522, 524-25, 660 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 578, 661 P.2d 478
(1983). Crespin and Davis follow the trend set by People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
In Wheeler, California applied the impartial jury guarantees of its state constitution after finding
numerous Swain challenges proved unsuccessful, even though numerous minorities continued to be
excluded from jury service. Id. at 761-62.
81. 109 N.M. 197, 784 P.2d 16 (1989).
82. Id. at 198, 784 P.2d at 17.
83. Id. at 201, 784 P.2d at 20.
84. Id. The court formally adopted the Wheeler doctrine that it had discussed earlier in Crespin
and Davis. Id.
85. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (per curiam) (1995).
86. Batson declined to provide much detail about conducting an inquiry, acknowledging that
trial courts employ different procedures and have experience conducting voir dire. See Batson, 476
U.S. at 99 n.24.
87. 105 N.M. 696, 736 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1987).
88. State v. Gonzales, 111 N.M. 590, 596, 808 P.2d 40, 46 (Ct. App.) (citations omitted) (a
showing that 80% of protected group were stricken meets prima facie case, even though members
of that group remained on jury), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 416, 806 P.2d 65 (1991).
89. State v. Jim, 107 N.M. 779, 781, 765 P.2d 195, 197 (Ct. App.) (a mere assertion that a
prospective juror belonged to racial group is insufficient, absent some evidence such as asking the
prospective juror about her race), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 720, 764 P.2d 491 (1988).
90. State v. Lara, 110 N.M. 507, 512, 797 P.2d 296, 301 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M.
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92
(3) the absence of members of defendant's racial group on the jury,
although some same-race jurors remaining on the petit jury is not a
determinative factor. 93 A pattern of using the strikes against members of
94
defendant's race may also support the inference of improper use.
At step two of the Batson inquiry, the proponent of the strike must
offer a reason "sufficient to provide an explanation that the trial court
can determine is a bona fide reason relating to legitimate criteria in
selecting a jury on behalf of the state." 95 Yet, rather than dwelling on
what constitutes a sufficient rebuttal, New Mexico appellate courts focus
on how to determine the credibility of a rebuttal, or step three of the
Batson inquiry. New Mexico interprets Batson to require trial courts to
are
evaluate whatever explanation is offered, and if the "reasons given
''
either implausible or suggestive of bias, to make further inquiry. 6
In determining whether the explanation is plausible, New Mexico courts
have examined the prosecutor's conduct during voir dire. The only New
Mexico Supreme Court decision addressing peremptory challenges, State
v. Aragon, has frowned upon a trial court's rubber-stamping prosecutor's
explanations, without "demanding ... articulate and explicit substantiation." 97 A clear indication of pretext is the varied treatment of white
and nonwhite members of the panel when the grounds for the peremptory
98
challenge are "equally applicable" to the white juror as well. Other
indicators of pretext may be the extent to which the proponent attempted
to question the juror about the suspected partiality, 99 and if the explanation
for exercising the peremptory challenge has not been tied to the case
being tried. 100 Correspondingly, evidence that the proponent's conduct

330, 795 P.2d 1022 (1990); Jim, 107 N.M. at 781, 765 P.2d at 197; State v. Goode, 107 N.M.
298, 301, 756 P.2d 578, 581 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 308, 756 P.2d 1203 (1988). Cf.
State v. Dominguez, 115 N.M. 445, 451-52, 853 P.2d 147, 154 (Ct. App.) (if percentage of jurors
of defendant's race is higher on petit jury than on panel, no prima facie inference), cert. denied,
115 N.M. 409, 852 P.2d 682 (1993). See also Gonzales, III N.M. at 595, 808 P.2d at 45 ("[a]single
prospective juror may be stricken for a racially motivated reason and the jury still retain its
,representative' character").
91. Lara, 110 N.M. at 512, 797 P.2d at 301; Jim, 107 N.M. at 781, 765 P.2d at 197; Goode,
107 N.M. at 301, 756 P.2d at 581.
92. Lara, 110 N.M. at 512, 797 P.2d at 301; Jim, 107 N.M. at 781,765 P.2d at 197; Goode,
107 N.M. at 301, 756 P.2d at 581 (citing U.S. v. Chalan, 812 F. 2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987).
93. See Jim, 107 N.M. at 782, 765 P.2d at 198. Cf Dominguez, 115 N.M. at 451, 853 P.2d
at 153 (the presence of same-race jurors "tends to undercut any inference of purposeful discrimination.")
94. Gonzales, III N.M. at 595, 808 P.2d at 45.
95. State v. Moore, III N.M. 619, 620, 808 P.2d 69, 70 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M.
706, 809 P.2d 56 (1991) [hereinafter Moore II].
96. State v. Moore, 109 N.M. 119, 127, 782 P.2d 91, 99 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M.
54, 781 P.2d 782 [hereinafter Moore I].
97. 109 N.M. 197, 202, 784 P.2d 16, 21 (1989). Although Aragon employs an impartial jury
principle, it extends the Batson test to such challenges.
98. Moore II, 111 N.M. at 621, 808 P.2d at 71. See also State v. Goode, 107 N.M. 298, 302,
756 P.2d 578, 582 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 107 N.M. 308, 756 P.2d 1203 (1988); State v. Dominguez,
115 N.M. 445, 450, 853 P.2d 147, 152 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 409, 852 P.2d 682 (1993).
99. Goode, 107 N.M. at 302, 756 P.2d at 582; State v. Jim, 107 N.M. 779, 782, 765 P.2d 195,
198 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 720, 764 P.2d 491 (1988).
100. Goode, 107 N.M. at 303, 756 P.2d at 583.
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during voir dire evinces careful consideration supports credibility, 0' as
does the fact that the proponent exercised only some of her peremptory
challenges when members of defendant's race remained on the petit jury. 0 2
Thus, without explicitly saying so, New Mexico appellate courts determine
whether purposeful discrimination exists by scrutinizing the proponent's
explanation and actions rather than reevaluating the prima facie showing.
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE GUZMAN COURT

On appeal, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court conducted
the Batson inquiry in an erroneous manner by considering defendant's
rights to an impartial jury while ignoring the jurors' equal protection
rights. 0 31 The court of appeals emphasized that the equal protection
prohibition of race-based challenges works to promote public confidence

in the courts. 1° Litigants share a prospective juror's interest in preventing

the discrimination which destroys that confidence.10 5 The trial court must
consider the equal protection interests of the jurors during a Batson
6
inquiry, since Batson's purpose was to protect such rights.'
The court of appeals then conducted its own Batson inquiry, applying
equal protection principles. The prosecutor acknowledged that a prima
facie showing of discrimination had been made by offering explanations
for the strikes before the trial court ruled on whether defendants established the necessary inference.) 7 Thus, the court of appeals assumed the
necessary inference of discrimination and proceeded to the second step
of the inquiry. 08
The court of appeals proceeded to step two by reviewing the explanations
for the strikes which had been offered by the prosecution to rebut the

101. Id.
102. State v. Lara, 110 N.M. 507, 512, 797 P.2d 296, 301 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M.
330, 795 P.2d 1022 (1990).
103. State v. Guzman, 119 N.M. 190, 193, 889 P.2d 225, 228 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 119
N.M. 20, 888 P.2d 466 (1995). The trial court found that Batson dealt with the fairness of the
jury, and saw no "con[c]erted plan to restrict the make up of the jury . . . particularly in view
of the preponderance" of Hispanics left on the venire. Id. (quoting district court's ruling) (alteration
in original) (emphasis added by court of appeals omitted). Yet "it is the stigma attached to the
disqualification of a juror because he or she appears to be of a particular racial or ethnic group
that the Supreme Court has has [sic] attempted to prevent since Strauder." Id. at 194, 889 P.2d
at 229.
104. Cf. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 193, 889 P.2d at 228 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
413-14 (1991) (racially rejected prospective jurors "may lose confidence in the court and its verdicts").
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 194, 889 P.2d at 229. See supra note 55.
108. Although the State, on appeal, challenged whether defendants had shown the jurors were
Hispanic, the court stated that identification by surname is sufficiently reliable to establish racial
background, absent an objection by opposing counsel at trial. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d
at 229. The State cited State v. Neely, 112 N.M. 702, 713, 819 P.2d 249, 260 (1991), which involved
a challenge to the jury pool being selected from voter registration lists rather than driver's license
records. Neely rejected the argument, stating, "[ain analysis of [H]ispanic surnames, without more,
is not an adequate indicator of whether an individual is of [H]ispanic descent." Id. The Guzman
court distinguished the issues of Neely from Batson inquiries, especially when both counsel and
judge appear to consent to the characterization at trial. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d at
229.
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prima facie showing.1°9 The prosecution struck two prospective jurors
because they were "young" and feared that they might identify with
Defendant Guzman, who was also young. 10° The court of appeals found
that this explanation lacked merit since the defendants were mother and
daughter and the prosecution failed to strike older potential jurors who
might identify with Gutierrez."' The two other Hispanic prospective jurors
were struck because they had "less responsible jobs involving less education." 1 2 The court of appeals reasoned that this explanation also lacked
merit because two of the remaining Anglo potential jurors had similar
educational and vocational backgrounds as the excused Hispanic jurors. " 3
The prosecution failed to point to characteristics unique to the stricken
jurors-race was the only classification which distinguished them from
the jurors left on the panel." 4 Thus, the prosecution failed to provide
a racially neutral explanation." 5 Defendants were granted a new trial to
rights not to be removed
protect prospective jurors' equal protection
6
from jury service on account of race."
V.

ANALYSIS OF GUZMAN AND IMPACT OF PURKETT

Guzman did not change New Mexico law. The court of appeals simply
corrected the trial court's failure to consider the equal protection rights
of the prospective jurors. With that purpose in mind, the court of appeals
cited United States Supreme Court decisions preventing racial discrimination in jury selection. Those cases underscore the importance of preserving a juror's right not to be excluded from jury service because of
her race." 7
Unfortunately, the court of appeals missed a wonderful opportunity
to explain the differing principles which give rise to state and federal
constitutional prohibitions. The United States Supreme Court has employed only an equal protection analysis to limit peremptory challenges,"'
while New Mexico courts have applied the impartial jury provision of

109. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d at 229. An explanation for striking the fifth prospective
Hispanic juror, if given by the prosecutor, is absent from the opinion.
110. Id.
Id.
111.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Although the court of appeals did not cite New Mexico authority for its review of the
explanation, it examined the explanation similarly to the way in which New Mexico courts have
done in the past. See discussion supra part III.B.
115. Guzman, 119 N.M. at 194, 889 P.2d at 229.
116. Id. at 195, 889 P.2d at 230. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986); Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
117. The court of appeals cited Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding a statute
unconstitutional that excluded African Americans from jury service); Carter v. Jury Commission,
396 U.S. 320 (1970) (where qualified African Americans were never summoned for jury service);
Batson; and two cases that expanded the ability to bring Batson challenges (Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400 (1991) and Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)).
118. The United States Supreme Court has declined to apply the Sixth Amendment to prohibit
the exercise of racially motivated peremptory challenges. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
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the state constitution." 19 An opinion which clarified the use of both
principles could lessen confusion, especially since the trial court in Guzman
considered one constitutional prohibition, but not the other. 20
The central importance of Guzman for this discussion is the way in
which the court of appeals evaluated the three-step Batson inquiry. Guzman is representative of Batson jurisprudence in New Mexico, which
conflicts with Purkett v. Elem, decided three months later. Put simply,
New Mexico has required a plausible explanation at step two of the
inquiry,' 21 while Purkett permits any explanation, no matter how silly or
superstitious. 122 The type of explanation required at step two affects which
party carries the burden of proof and, therefore, which party will win
in close-call situations.
Purkett asserts that the burden of proof "never shifts from the opponent
of the strike." 23 Although the court may choose to disbelieve the proffered
explanation during step three of the analysis, it must accept a race neutral
explanation at step two. 24 Under this analysis, the second step of the
inquiry is actually a burden of production rather than a burden of proof.
The result is a type of balancing test, with a bare minimum required
on the proponent's side of the scale. Little is required from the proponent
to explain his motivation, although the main goal of the Batson inquiry
is to determine whether that motivation was racially based. 21
In contrast, New Mexico courts have conducted Batson inquiries by
shifting focus from the opponent once the prima facie showing was
established. If the trial court questioned the credibility of the explanation
offered at step two, Aragon instructed courts to conduct further inquiry
for an "articulate and explicit substantiation" of the explanation proffered
at step two. 26 In addition, New Mexico appellate courts have examined
the suggested motivation for the challenges in light of the actions of the
proponent, rather than reexamining the prima facie case, or asking for
more from the strike's opponent. 27 New Mexico's evaluation of the
proponent's actions in conjunction with the "plausibility" requirement
represents an attempt to prevent race neutral explanations which actually
mask racial motivation.

119. See, e.g., State v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 197, 784 P.2d 16 (1989).
120. State v. Guzman, 119 N.M. 190, 192, 889 P.2d 225, 227 (Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 119
N.M. 20, 888 P.2d 466 (1995). The court of appeals' language is also misleading:
A review of United States Supreme Court cases establishing the constitutional
parameters of the limitations on peremptory challenges indicates the prohibition is
grounded not only in a defendant's right to a fair cross-section of jurors but also
in the principle that all citizens have the right to, participate in jury service.
Id. (emphasis added) In fact, the United States Supreme Court has never expanded the Sixth
Amendment's impartial jury provision to limit peremptory challenges. Holland, 493 U.S. at 476.
121. See supra note 8.
122. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
126. State v. Aragon, 109 N.M. 197, 202, 784 P.2d 16, 21 (1989).
127. See discussion supra part III.B.
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These conflicts present the question of whether New Mexico will provide
more protection than the federal constitutional mandates of Purkett. Of
course, New Mexico is bound by the United States Supreme Court's
equal protection analysis; however, it also may require a plausible explanation under the state constitution.
If it chooses to follow Purkett's instruction, two problems may occur
on appellate review. First, if the proponent of the strike initiates the
second step of the inquiry by offering an explanation prematurely, the
underlying prima facie showing required at step one may not be adequately
substantiated in the record. 28 A record containing an incomplete prima
facie showing, coupled with meager evidence of the proponent's motivation
for offering the strike, will result in more cases being remanded, or the
inquiry being subjected to less scrutiny on appeal. Second, the type of
issue raised in Guzman could further frustrate appellate review when the
trial court applies inadequate principles at step three to evaluate steps
one and two of the inquiry. A race neutral explanation in a cold record
will make an appellate court's review of the proponent's motivation even
more difficult. Again, appellate courts will have to remand a greater
number of cases or simply accept the explanation at face value.
New Mexico may avoid these problems by requiring more from a
proponent before advancing to step three of the inquiry. If New Mexico
decides to require a plausible excuse from the proponent to satisfy step
two, it may turn to the New Mexico Constitution to limit peremptory
challenges, as it has done before. New Mexico can graft its own application
of Batson to both the impartial jury and equal protection provisions of
the New Mexico Constitution, while continuing to conduct Batson inquiries
by analyzing the credibility of the explanation based on the proponent's
actions. At the very least, New Mexico courts could follow Purkett, but
review more carefully those cases on appeal in which the proponent offers
his explanation before the trial court rules on the prima facie case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Guzman represents another case in which the court of appeals has
carefully examined the explanations proffered for peremptory challenges
at step two of the inquiry. In light of Purkett, New Mexico courts may
review all future Batson inquiries by applying its own constitution to
require a plausible explanation at step two, as it has in Aragon. To
promote meaningful review of questionable explanations, New Mexico
courts have already enunciated clear, specific guidelines for conducting
Batson inquiries. In addition, New Mexico courts have evinced a willingness to apply the impartial jury provisions of the New Mexico Constitution when the United States Supreme Court has not provided an
adequate procedure for rooting out racially motivated strikes. A plau-

128. See Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1772-73 (Stevens, J., dissenting). According to Justice Stevens'
dissent, this was the case in Purkett itself.
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sibility requirement at step two coincides with New Mexico taking seriously
what the United States Supreme Court considers a mere formality.
PAMELA C. CHILDERS

